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Abstract 
Widespread empirical consistency with the pecking order theory of capital 
structure (Myers & Majluf, 1984) has led researchers to conclude that small and 
medium sized enterprises conform to this theory’s predictions. In chapter 2, a 
formal model is presented that allows for plausible and empirically supported 
psychological owner/manager objectives in addition to the profit motive. This 
chapter provides an alternative explanation of preferences for low leverage that 
does not rely on informational asymmetry, as well as predicting limits on firm 
sizes, and the existence of collateral. 
 
In chapter 3, a formal model of the entrepreneurship decision with credit is 
presented for firms with managers who overestimate their probability of success. 
Explanations for credit rationing, predatory lending, and the existence of collateral 
are produced and the welfare implications of overconfidence are investigated in an 
equilibrium model. It is found that overconfidence can increase overall welfare 
but harms entrepreneurs who are able to engage in poor projects. 
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1. Introduction 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) make up more than 99% of 
businesses in New Zealand and provide around 60% of employment. Around the 
world, SMEs make up similar proportions of the business population. It is clear 
that the contribution of SMEs to society is substantial and the need to understand 
SMEs is an important issue for economists and policy makers. 
 
The particular issues of SME financing, entry, and growth are important ones. 
Economic growth is an important public goal and a popularly cited path to this 
growth is through SME investment. This thesis provides two formal models of the 
borrowing and investment/entry decision of the firm. The first models non-
financial motivations and explains limits on firm size and debt amongst SMEs, as 
well as the presence of collateral. The second models firm managers as 
overconfident in their business prospects, providing explanations for predatory 
lending, credit rationing, and collateral. 
 
The two main chapters in this thesis are written in a paper-like format and can be 
read independently. Each sub-topic is introduced in more detail within the chapter 
itself. Conclusions for each model are also provided within the chapters. 
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2. Non-financial motivations and the entrepreneurship decision 
with debt 
 
What can be added to the happiness of a man who is in health, out of debt, 
and has a clear conscience? 
- Adam Smith (1790, p. I.III.7) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The well-known classical argument that justifies profit maximisation as the firm’s 
objective relies on the assumption that the firm has many individual owners with 
heterogeneous preferences. It would be impractical and costly for managers to 
directly arrange firm activities to meet the diverse individual preferences of the 
firm owners. Maximising firm profit allows owners to satisfy their preferences 
through the product markets. However, since privately held small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) by definition have few shareholders, the classical 
argument is not appropriate and, in reality, the firm goal of gaining profits is 
combined with other personal objectives of the SME shareholders. These 
objectives may conflict with wealth maximisation. 
  
The dominant financing theories, based on the simplifying assumption that firms 
maximise the financial wealth of shareholders, have questionable applicability to 
small and medium enterprises. The pecking order theory assumes informational 
asymmetry between firms and financiers and shows that wealth maximising firms 
should first finance investment internally, given available funds (Myers & Majluf, 
1984). Theories predicting an optimal target capital structure balance the wealth 
enhancing aspects of debt, such as tax advantages (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; 
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Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963), and control of agency costs to shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), against the wealth reducing aspects of debt, such as 
financial distress costs and agency costs to debt holders. 
 
The reluctance to relinquish control and the desire for independence are oft-cited 
examples of real life attitudes small firm owner/managers hold (Ang, 1992; 
Bolton Committee, 1971). Lifestyle factors are also considered important in 
explaining SME behaviour, such as the trade-off between leisure and work 
(Kirkwood & Tootell, 2008). The concept of ‘positive atmosphere’ in the 
workplace, contributing to job satisfaction, is another important issue for SMEs 
(Wiklund, Davidsson, & Delmar, 2003). All of these objectives can conflict with 
the goal of profit maximisation and all are important to consider when developing 
policy and theory. 
 
Previous empirical studies of SME capital structure have used the conventional 
large-firm theories in their motivations and implicitly assume SMEs maximise 
profits. As a corollary to this assumption, these studies have also assumed that 
SMEs, in general, desire growth and seek external finance (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
& Maksimovic, 2008; Cassar & Holmes, 2003; Chittenden, Hall, & Hutchinson, 
1996; Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2004; Michaelas, Chittenden, & 
Poutziouris, 1999; Ramalho & da Silva, 2009; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Exceptions 
include Lucey and Mac an Bhaird (2006) and, to a lesser extent, Degryse, de 
Goeij and Kappert (2009), and Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009). Lucey and Mac an 
Bhaird examine 299 Irish SMEs and conclude that the desire for independence 
and control is important in SME capital structure decisions, while Degryse, de 
Goeij and Kappert, and Psillaki and Daskalakis cite independence and control as a 
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possible explanation of their finding related to profitability. The general 
conclusion drawn by these studies is that SMEs conform to the pecking order 
theory and that it is informational asymmetry which explains the observed 
preference for internal funds. 
 
Few direct tests have been performed to determine the severity of the 
informational asymmetry problem. Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008) report credit 
rating disagreements (a measure of informational opacity) in Finland SMEs to be 
around 50% suggesting this problem does indeed exist; however, the extent to 
which this affects credit markets was not investigated. Interestingly, Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen find the frequency of rating disagreement is unrelated to SME size when 
controlling for firm age. It is, however, conventionally assumed that firm size and 
informational opacity are inversely related. Until there exists substantial direct 
empirical evidence demonstrating the effect of informational asymmetry on SME 
credit markets, a convincing argument for the dominance of the traditional 
pecking order theory in SME credit markets cannot be made. 
 
It has been shown empirically that SME managers have preferences for 
independence, control, (Bolton Committee, 1971; Cressy, 1995), employee well-
being (TD Bank, 2010; Wiklund et al., 2003), and the leisure/labour balance 
(Kirkwood & Tootell, 2008). Vos, Yeh, Carter, and Tagg (2007) also paint the 
small firm as one which is unconcerned with the excesses of wealth and document 
that only around 8% of UK SMEs have the objective to grow rapidly. Growth 
aversion in SMEs has also been documented in several other works (Davidsson, 
1989; Kolvereid, 1992; Storey, 1994). However, many recent papers, continue to 
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represent small firms as wealth oriented, and even at some stage on the path to an 
IPO (e.g. Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006). 
 
Wiklund et al. (2003) attempt to find the relationship between the expected 
consequences of firm growth and actual growth motivation using Swedish SMEs.  
In this important paper, a linear regression model is estimated with standardised 
coefficients and which shows that concerns for independence, control, and 
positive atmosphere as well as personal income have the strongest relationships 
with stated growth motivation. This allows the inference that small firm owners 
do indeed perceive their firms as having a better atmosphere than hypothetical 
larger firms and that this preference is important for growth decisions. 
 
In the economics of entrepreneurship literature, there are few microeconomic 
theory papers which deviate from the profit maximising assumption. Levesque, 
Shepherd, and Douglas (2002) develop a dynamic extension to Douglas and 
Shepherd (2000) who model the small firm entry decision to be a utility-
maximising response that depends on independence as well as other self-
employment perquisites. Generally, amongst the entrepreneurship literature, the 
complex motivations of entrepreneurs are acknowledged. 
 
Some psychologists have also participated in this line of research. Schindehutte, 
Morris, and Allen (2006) directly show, using in-depth psychological interviews, 
that entrepreneurs are more concerned with psychological aspects of 
entrepreneurship such as peak performance, peak experience, and flow, compared 
with extrinsic rewards such as money. Their results suggest we should place less 
emphasis on small business as simply a mode of wealth generation and economic 
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growth and more emphasis on entrepreneurship as a mode of increasing well-
being and happiness directly. 
 
A previous paper that attempts to theoretically model non-financial motivations in 
the entrepreneurship decision with debt is Cressy (1995). This paper models debt 
as a variable which contributes negatively to an entrepreneur’s decision to proceed 
with a variable sized project that requires external financing. The term for 
entrepreneurs’ dislike of external debt in Cressy is [external] “control aversion” 
(pp. 261). In Cressy, control aversion represents an assumed negative and concave 
relationship between debt and decision utility. The current chapter extends Cressy 
by modelling collateral as a variable which reduces the disutility of debt and 
project size as a variable which contributes negatively to the decision to go ahead 
with the project. 
 
In Cressy (1995), the justification for including debt as a negative decision factor 
in his model was that lenders impose monitoring and controls on the firm, 
presumably either in the form of restrictive covenants or by collecting information 
from the firm for valuation, which is disliked by the firm. Debt impacts decision 
utility independently of the level of profits, so this is interpreted as a purely 
psychological aversion to this monitoring. Because of the empirical observation of 
an aversion to outside control amongst small business owners, only monitoring 
which impacts on control in the form of restrictive covenants is justified here. The 
common foundational justification for monitoring in the form of restrictive 
covenants is to mitigate the problems of moral hazard (e.g. Holmström & Tirole, 
1997). This can be the interpretation of the reason why the lender engages in this 
monitoring. Following from this, any other device which removes moral hazard 
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risk for the lender will reduce monitoring intensity and, consequently, the 
disutility to the entrepreneur. Collateral is one of these devices. Collateral reduces 
the risky portion of repayment to the lender and therefore reduces the incentive to 
monitor. If collateral is included in a model of this sort, it should reduce the 
disutility to debt. Because this important effect is omitted in Cressy, the optimal 
level of collateral is found to be zero when it can potentially be positive. 
 
Preferences for independence, positive atmosphere, and the leisure/labour balance 
are able to be incorporated into the model through the project size variable. 
Independence (that is unrelated to profits) can be broadly interpreted but typically 
is related to self-reliance. A larger project requires more input from outside 
sources, such as higher external capital and extra managerial staff, increasing the 
degree to which the entrepreneur relies on others. An entrepreneur who prefers to 
be self-reliant will choose a smaller project than an otherwise similar entrepreneur 
who is indifferent to their level of self-reliance. 
 
The leisure/labour balance motivation interacts with the preference for 
independence/control in the in the context of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs 
looking to increase income must take on larger projects. Since larger projects are 
more complex, entrepreneurs must forgo either control to another manager or 
leisure in order to spend more time managing the firm. Either is a potential source 
of disutility to the manager that is related to project size. 
 
In summary, the aforementioned non-financial motivations are able to be 
modelled most parsimoniously using two variables in the decision utility function 
in addition to profit. External control arising from monitoring intensity can be 
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measured by the risky portion of a loan, which is reduced by collateral. 
Independence, the leisure/labour balance and positive atmosphere can be 
measured by the size of the project itself (which has an identity relationship with 
the size of the loan if no internal funds are used). 
 
2.2 The model 
An entrepreneur is to decide whether or not to engage in a risky project of variable 
size that is dependent on external capital investment. Firms are financially risk 
averse and exhibit risky-debt aversion (resulting from, for example, aversion to 
outside control or monitoring) and aversion to firm size (resulting from, for 
example, preferences for firm manageability, positive atmosphere, and the non-
risky portion of the debt itself). 
 
The firm is assumed to have no endowment of investable wealth so the entire cost 
of the project,  , is to be borrowed from the credit market. Extending this model to 
allow for partial self-financing is straightforward and does not substantially alter 
the results of the model. The firm is endowed with  ̅ of non-liquid assets that are 
unable to be invested directly in the project. The firm is able to offer any portion 
of this endowment as collateral. The amount offered is denoted as   and these 
assets have value    to the lender with      .    is interpreted as the 
liquidated value of the collateral and takes account of direct liquidation costs as 
well as any difference in the value of use to the entrepreneur and the market value 
of the assets. The project is assumed to return  ( ) on success, with probability  , 
and zero on failure. It is assumed that the project has positive net present value 
(NPV) or   ( )      for all values of  .  Both the opportunity cost of lending 
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(the market interest rate) and the opportunity cost of engaging in the project are 
normalised to 0. 
 
The value of the loan which will be subject to monitoring (the risky portion of the 
loan) is        and the variable that represents firm size is the investment 
required,  . Monitoring from the lender is assumed to be costless and occurs 
exogenously. 
 
The lender offers a set of acceptable lending contracts to the entrepreneur that 
depend on the offered collateral and the size of the project. The share of the 
project return on success that goes to the lender is   (   ) and the share which 
goes to the entrepreneur is   (   )   ( )    (   ). 
 
Lenders are assumed to be risk neutral and competitive so the expected profit for 
the lender must be zero: 
 
    (   )        (1) 
This yields the offer set in (   ) space which is presented to the entrepreneur: 
 
   
  (   )  
 
  (2) 
The entrepreneur then maximises expected utility over   and  . The final wealth 
to the entrepreneur upon success is denoted by 
 
 (   )   ( )    (   )  
  ( )    (   )  
 
  (3) 
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and the entrepreneur pays   to the lender upon failure. The utility function 
depends on three factors, the final wealth of the entrepreneur  , the risky or 
monitored portion of the loan       , and the size of the project  . The 
program the entrepreneur faces is 
   
   
 [ ( (   )  (   )  )] 
           ̅         
where                  and     . Note that the first and last constraint 
together imply that    . The final constraint is not a physical feature of the 
model but it is included so that the objective function is smooth across the feasible 
region and it only excludes a suboptimal region. Without this constraint the 
negative contribution to utility that comes from the risky loan portion would fall 
to zero and remain at zero if collateral were rise above    . Because collateral 
costs the entrepreneur financially (   ) and the entrepreneur gains no 
psychological benefit from collateral above      , any acceptable contract with 
      will be weakly dominated by one with      . 
 
Expanding the expectation and replacing   with the final wealth to the 
entrepreneur in the respective states, the program becomes 
 
   
   
[  (
  ( )    (   )  
 
       )
 (   ) (         )] 
           ̅         
(4) 
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At this stage it is convenient to assume additive separability in the three decision 
factors in order to simplify the analysis. With this assumption, the marginal utility 
of one decision factor is restricted so that it does not depend on the other decision 
factors.  That is, it does not allow for any interaction effects between the decision 
factors. For example, an increase in the risky portion of the loan is equally 
harmful (in certain dollars) to an entrepreneur who engages in a highly profitable 
project as it is to the same entrepreneur who engages in a less profitable project.  
The utility function then becomes 
 
 ( (   )  (   )  )    ( (   ))    ( (   ))    ( )  (5) 
and the program (4) becomes 
 
   
   
[   ( (   ))  (   )  (  )    ( (   ))    ( )] 
           ̅         
(6) 
Assuming an interior solution, the first first-order-condition is 
  [ ]
  
    
 ( (   ))  (  ( )  
 
 
)    
 ( (   ))    
 ( )     
  (  ( )  
 
 
)  
  
 ( (   ))    
 ( )
  
 ( (   ))
  
 
    ( )         (7) 
where       denotes the number of dollars in the good state that the firm would 
require in order to induce them to take on an extra unit of risky debt/firm size. So 
this condition says that, given  , the firm will choose a value of   such that the 
expected marginal dollar gained by increasing size   (left hand side) equals the 
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sum of the marginal rate of substitution of income for risky loans and the marginal 
rate of substitution of income for firm size, when evaluated at the entrepreneurs 
good-state income (right hand side). The expected extra amount earned as a result 
of the last unit of   must just compensate the entrepreneur for taking on the larger 
loan and the larger firm size.  
 
The second first order condition when assuming an interior solution is 
  [ ]
  
    
 ( (   )) (
   
 
 )  (   )  
 (  )      
 ( (   ))     
 
 (   ) (   
 ( (   ))    
 (  ))     
 ( (   ))     (8) 
Note that 
   
 ( (   ))    
 (  )     
as   
          Collateral reduces the negative effects of gaining a loan through 
reduced monitoring but also costs the risk averse entrepreneur through both the 
loss of value of collateral when transferred to the lender and the increase in the 
dispersion of returns. This condition explicitly balances these benefits and costs; 
for a given  , the marginal psychological benefit of collateral through reduced 
risky loan size,    
 ( (   )), must equal the expected marginal financial cost of 
collateral,  (   ) (   
 ( (   ))    
 (  )). 
 
Under certain collections of assumptions on   
     
     
    and    , the second order 
conditions for a maximum can be met. A special case for these quantities is 
presented in the following section which allows the model solution to be tractable. 
13 
 
 
2.3 The simplified model 
In this section, the model is fully solved in the special case when the entrepreneur 
has constant absolute risk aversion  , the risky loan and firm size decision factors 
have constant marginal utilities   and   respectively, and the project exhibits 
constant financial returns to scale so  ( )    .1 The assumption of constant 
absolute risk aversion removes the income effect of changes in wealth on risk 
preferences. For example, a very wealthy individual would view a $500 bet as just 
as risky as a very poor individual under this assumption. Thus, changes in the 
parameters that affect average income will not take into account this income 
effect. 
 
The assumptions that the risky loan and firm size decision factors have constant 
marginal utilities are made for simplicity and they remove any curvature effects in 
these variables. The utility function being globally concave is all that is required 
to guarantee a solution to the utility maximisation problem. Risk aversion in final 
wealth with constant marginal utilities in the risky loan and firm size decision 
factors yields a globally concave utility function. 
 
Constant financial returns to scale occurs when the firm’s price and marginal cost 
are constant
2
. This is a reasonable assumption for small firms who have little 
impact on their product or input prices. Constant returns to scale in the production 
                                                     
1
 The second order conditions and comparative statics were also computed assuming the utility 
function was concave in the negative decision factors. The expressions are rather unwieldy and the 
only interesting result noticed which is not captured by the presented model is that     must be 
bounded at a positive value to ensure a solution exists. 
2
 The profit function upon success can be represented as   ( ( )   ( )) . Investment is 
   ( )  yielding   (
 ( )
 ( )
  )  . Thus, if  ( ) and  ( ) are constant, the profit function will 
exhibit constant financial returns to scale. 
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function can be justified by the replicability argument. The utility function in (5) 
can now be expressed as 
 
 (     )    
    
 
        (9) 
and the expected utility maximisation problem is 
 
   
   
[  
 
 
 
  (
      (   )  
 
)
 
(   )
 
         ] 
           ̅         
(10) 
The Lagrange function for this problem is 
    
 
 
 
  (
      (   )  
 
)
 
(   )
 
     (    )       (  )
   (   ̅)    (     )  
The necessary conditions for a maximisation when the constraints are all less than 
or equal to zero are 
  
  
 
  
  
             ̅          
  (  )    (   ̅)    (     )     
The full solution to this programme was solved using Maple. The Maple output 
used is presented in Appendix 1. The solutions for the  ’s are used to find 
conditions on the parameters which will yield the different solutions. The 
presentation approach is to number the six different classes of solution from   to 
 . The KKT multipliers are denoted as     where   is the KKT multiplier number 
and   is the solution number. Figure 1 graphically depicts in (   ) space the 
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feasible region along with the locations of the various numbered solutions. The 
solutions themselves are listed below. 
 
Figure 1 – Feasible solution region with locations of various numbered 
solutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The interior solution (                 ) is                and 
 
   
  ((
    
   )
 
(
(    )(   )
 ( (   )    (   ))
)
 (   )
)
 (    )
  
   
 
 
  (
 ( (   )    (   ))
(    )(   )
)  
(11) 
Conditions which will yield this solution are                  : 
 
(    )(   )   ((   )    (   ))     ̅(    )(   )  (12) 
  
   ̅ 
     
      
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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(    )    (   )        
where    is the unique solution to 
  (   )      (   )    (   )         
 
The solution  (                 )  with      is              and 
 
   
 
 (    )
  (
    
   
)   
    
 ((   )    (   ))  (    )(   ) 
    
  
(13) 
Conditions which will yield this solution are            : 
 
 ((   )    (   ))  (    )(   )  
          
(14) 
 
The solution (                 )  with         
  
 
  ̅ is           and 
 
         
    (    ) 
   (   )        
(15) 
where    is the unique solution to 
 
  (   )      (   )    (   )         (16) 
Conditions which will yield this solution are                  : 
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(    )    (   )        
  (   )          
(   )   ̅      (   )     (   ) ̅   
(17) 
 
The solution (                 )  with     ̅         ̅  is           
and 
 
   
   (
    
   )    
(   ) ̅
 (    )
  
    ̅  
     
 ((   )    (   ))     ̅(    )(   ) 
    
  
(18) 
Conditions which will yield this solution are            : 
 
 ((   )    (   ))     ̅(    )(   )  
(    )    (   ) ̅       
(19) 
 
The solution (                 )  with      ̅     ̅       is 
    (   ) 
  ̅   (   )     (   ) ̅      
    (    ) 
   (   ) ̅       
Conditions which will yield this solution are            : 
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(   )   ̅      (   )     (   ) ̅   
(    )    (   ) ̅       
(20) 
 
The solution (                 ) with             is 
      (   )     (   )  
              
Conditions which will yield this solution are            : 
 
  (   )          
          
(21) 
It can be easily verified that the objective function is globally concave
3
, so the 
first order conditions are sufficient for a maximum. Because the solution to this 
problem depends on six parameters, the various solution regions are not able to be 
visualised graphically. 
 
Solution 6 represents those individuals who do not engage in projects they have 
access to. This group is of particular social interest as it represents people who 
choose not to become entrepreneurs due to the negative aspects of risky loan 
monitoring and firm size. The second condition in (21) shows that for investment 
to occur, the expected marginal financial return to the first unit of investment must 
                                                     
3
 This is shown in  
 
 
 
Appendix 2. 
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exceed the marginal psychological cost of that first unit. Thus, increasing project 
returns, the probability of success, and the liquid ratio of collateral will all 
increase investment for marginal firms. Decreasing the marginal disutilities of 
risky loans and firm size will also increase investment for marginal firms. 
Importantly, there are individuals in this group who are non-marginal who will 
not respond to policies intended to increase investment that do not push them over 
this threshold. 
 
Note that, in this formulation, ignoring the unconventional psychological 
considerations (     ) will result in investment for all firms with positive 
NPV projects. 
 
2.4 Comparative statics 
The following comparative statics analysis will investigate the effects on firm size 
  and collateral   of the six various parameters: coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion    coefficient of risky debt aversion    coefficient of firm size aversion    
revenue-investment ratio (upon success)    probability of success    and liquidity 
ratio of collateral  . These are ordered by parameter and are obtained using the 
interior solution. 
  
  
  
  ((
    
   )
 
(
(    )(   )
 ( (   )    (   ))
)
 (   )
)
  (    )
  
  
  
 
    
  
  
  
  (
 ( (   )    (   ))
(    )(   )
)
  
  
  
 
    
20 
 
Increasing risk aversion will decrease both investment size and collateral. 
Increasing each of the variables increases the dispersion of returns to the 
entrepreneur (regardless of the liquidity ratio  ), so a more risk averse 
entrepreneur will use less of each.
4
 
  
  
 
  ( (   )    (   )   (   )(   )(   ))
(   )( (   )    (   )) (    )
    
  
  
 
 (   )
 ( (   )    (   ))
    
Increasing risky loan aversion will decrease firm size and increase collateral. The 
result for collateral is intuitive as collateral directly reduces the negative effects of 
the risky loan portion. In the presence of collateral, the result for firm size is non-
trivial, as the firm could intuitively only make more use of their available 
collateral and leave investment unchanged in response to a change in risky loan 
aversion. This result shows that a combination of increasing collateral and 
reducing firm size is optimal for the firm. Recall result (7) that stated the marginal 
rate of substitution of income for firm size/risky loan must equal the expected 
marginal dollar earned from increased investment. Increasing risky loan aversion 
and collateral both contribute to increasing the marginal rate of substitution of 
income for firm size/risky loan. The risky loan aversion directly increases the 
amount of income required to substitute for a unit of firm size/risky loan and the 
increase in collateral increases the income the lender will offer in the good state, 
causing the marginal utility of good-state income to decrease. Firm size must 
decrease in order to compensate for both of these changes. 
                                                     
4
 There is a problem with the setup of the utility function in that the marginal rate of substitution 
between a certain dollar and one of the negative decision factors depends on risk aversion. 
Intuitively, if there is no variability in returns (   ), a change in risk aversion should not affect 
the MRS between certain wealth and one of the other factors. 
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  ( (   )    (   )    (   )(   ) )
(   )( (   )    (   )) (    )
    
  
  
 
   
 ( (   )    (   ))
    
Increasing firm size aversion decreases firm size and increases the use of available 
collateral. The reduction in firm size is intuitive as firm size itself is made more 
undesirable. The increase in collateral arises as the financial cost of collateral 
from (8) must be held constant. Condition (8) is repeated below in the simplified 
context: 
(   ) (  
  (
      (   )  
 
)
    )        
The investment size   decreases, causing the good state profit to decrease and, 
consequently, the marginal utility of good state profit (the first exponential) to 
increase. Collateral increases so that both the good state profit increases and the 
bad state loss increases in order to keep the total marginal financial cost of 
collateral constant. 
 
It is also interesting to note that the magnitudes of both derivatives with respect to 
  are smaller than the respective magnitudes of both derivatives with respect to  . 
This is due to the entrepreneur being able to increase collateral in direct response 
to the increase in risky debt aversion, which then causes an even larger decrease in 
firm size. This result shows that for firms that use collateral, a small increase in 
risky debt aversion will more severely impact on the size of firms than an 
equivalent increase in firm size aversion. 
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  either increases or decreases as a result of profitability increasing. Firstly, from 
condition (7), the expected marginal return to increasing size   (left hand side) 
increases. Thus, the marginal rate of substitution of income for risky loan/firm 
size (right hand side) must also increase, meaning income   ((    )  
(   )  )   must increase. For high values of  , the increase required is small 
enough so that   must decrease in order to counter the initial increase in  . 
Intuitively, the marginal utility of income is so small that the entrepreneur is better 
off taking a small increase in income by reducing firm size and gaining the benefit 
of reducing the risky loan size and firm size. This captures the idea of satiation. 
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Note that, even if investment falls as a result of the increase in profitability, the 
overall effect on good state profit   will be positive. This is what causes collateral 
to decrease when   increases. Because good-state profit increases as a result of   
increasing, collateral must decrease to maintain the constant financial cost of 
collateral in condition (8). 
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Both results relating to the liquidity of collateral are intuitive. Increasing liquidity 
increases the use of collateral as there is less inefficiency created by its use. For 
the same reason, the lender demands less repayment in the good state, increasing 
income for the borrower. This decreases the marginal utility of income which, by 
condition (7), must be held constant. Thus, investment   must decrease. 
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Increasing the probability of success can either increase or decrease both 
investment size and collateral. From both (7) and (8), it is clear there is a 
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complicated relationship between the variables and   making the intuition for 
these effects difficult. Numerical trials show up to two turning points in the  -  
relationship. Two turning points occur if profitability   is high. If   is high, for 
low values of   there is a sharp increase in   up to a relative plateau with a slight 
decrease in   until some middle value of   and then   continuing to increase 
slightly for higher values of  . For low values of profitability   the  -  
relationship is increasing. The  -  relationship is U-shaped for low values of   
and increasing for high values of  . 
 
The general increasing relationship between   and   is intuitive. The average 
profit gained from an extra unit of   increases with  , making increases in   more 
attractive.  
 
The signs of the above comparative statics are summarised in Table 1.   
Table 1 – Comparative statics for solution 1 in non-financial motivations 
model. 
Parameter 
  
   
 
  
   
 
  – Coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  – Coefficient of risky loan 
aversion 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  – Coefficient of firm size aversion 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  – Revenue-investment ratio 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  – Liquidity ratio of collateral 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  – Probability of success 
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
2.5 Discussion/Conclusion 
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Given that small businesses provide such a large proportion of employment, the 
understanding of how these entities operate is paramount for policy making in this 
area. The model presented in this chapter attempts to incorporate the most 
important decision factors that influence small business owner/managers in their 
borrowing and investment decisions. In the most recent Survey of Small Business 
Finance (SSBF), around 50% of small firms in the USA reported that they had not 
recently applied for financing nor were they discouraged from applying for fear of 
denial (Cole, 2010). It can be inferred that these firms either chose to forgo any 
new investment beyond what their ongoing profit allowed them to make (due to 
nonfinancial considerations) or these firms had no profitable growth opportunities. 
The model in this chapter provides a plausible explanation of small firms’ lack of 
growth motivation, their low observed leverage, and their use of collateral. The 
entrepreneur trades off the negative aspects of increasing firm size and debt 
against generated profit, yielding limits on firm size and debt. In a dynamic 
setting, it’s easy to see that a firm can potentially choose to reduce debt using 
retained profits in order to gain non-financial benefits, at the expense of either 
immediate consumption or firm investment. 
 
In order for the profit-only model to have empirical traction, one must invoke 
decreasing returns to scale as the main driver behind the observed finite firm 
sizes. Financial constraints alone cannot explain the observed variation in firm 
size as such a large proportion of firms do not seek financing. The latter 
explanation is still often assumed or implied in the literature. 
 
This model can provide insight into Rice and Strahan (2010) which found a 
measure of increase in credit supply in the USA did not bring about an increase in 
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borrowing amongst SMEs. As in previous SME papers, the explanation in Rice 
and Strahan is that lenders restrict quantity due to asymmetric information and 
thus credit supply increases do not necessarily translate into increased observed 
leverage. However, if the population contains many firms whose managers have 
high aversion to the negative aspects of engaging in further projects, an empirical 
increase in credit supply can potentially show a negligible impact on borrowing 
rates. 
 
There does exist current evidence that small business owners value independence, 
control, positive atmosphere, and leisure and the model presented provides a 
simple framework for incorporating these nonfinancial motivations into the credit 
and growth decision of a firm. The challenge for future research is to devise 
experimental testing that can isolate the relative importance of each of these 
decision factors amongst small business owners. Policy makers can also take note 
that there are negative welfare effects of growth at the firm level. While firm 
growth can increase employment, firm growth can negatively affect the welfare of 
the owner, as well as the job satisfaction of the employees. In addition, artificially 
increasing incentives to invest through, for example, reducing the cost of 
borrowing for small firms won’t increase investment from non-marginal non-
borrowers in a model of this type. Thus, the predictions of increased investment 
and increased employment, as a result of a stimulus policy such as subsidising 
loans, may be overstated. 
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3. Overconfidence and the entrepreneurship decision with debt 
 
No. I see it as an asset. Absolutely. I am not joking. I am not overconfident. 
- Romano Prodi, former Italian prime minister                                                    
and economics professor speaking on the euro. 
(Quoted in Dickey, 2005) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Eighty percent of people believe they are above average drivers; seventy percent 
of people believe they are above average leaders; seventy percent of teachers 
believe they are above average in terms of teaching ability. We’ve all heard 
statistics such as these quoted that demonstrate that humans are somewhat 
prideful beings. We discount the abilities of others and we overestimate our own. 
Referred to by economists (usually) as ‘overconfidence’5, or ‘optimism’, this 
effect has important implications for entry into entrepreneurship as well as entry 
into projects by existing firms. Due to this overconfidence, potential entrepreneurs 
with fundamentally poor projects can engage in investment despite being expected 
to be left worse off in reality. 
 
Entrepreneurs with sufficient personal assets are able to invest in any project 
which they believe will be beneficial. Despite harming the entrepreneur in 
expectation, a poor project going ahead still has social value as it increases total 
production. The expected loss in wealth to the entrepreneur is effectively 
transferred to the resource holders, such as employees, who benefit from the 
                                                     
5
 Psychologists have referred to this effect as “illusory superiority’, the ‘above average effect’, 
‘superiority bias’, ‘leniency error’, ‘sense of relative superiority’, and ‘the Lake Wobegon effect’. 
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investment. To the extent that resources are not diverted from more productive 
uses, the overall effect of overconfidence on welfare can be positive. For example, 
in an economy with high unemployment, poor projects going ahead can put 
unemployed resources to use and create value. 
 
Credit markets increase the incidence of this investment as lenders can profit from 
enabling partially funded entrepreneurs to invest. Overconfidence in the credit 
market setting was modelled in de Meza and Southey (1996) (with a note in 
Hillier (1998))
6
 which provides a plausible explanation for the existence of 
collateral, as well as credit rationing. Predatory lending is also a result implied by 
their model. The driver of these results is asymmetry in the assessments of the 
probability distribution of outcomes, potentially as a result of overconfidence.  
 
The current chapter adds to de Meza and Southey (1996) by setting up a similar 
entrepreneurship situation and investigating the implications of overconfidence 
for aggregate welfare. In addition, the directional effects of the various parameters 
on both welfare and the prevalence of credit rationing are provided, it is 
demonstrated that overconfidence is not analytically equivalent to situations 
where the entrepreneur gains some private benefit upon success of the project, and 
the explanation for collateral is explicitly provided. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
Credit rationing was defined in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, pp. 394-395) as a 
situation in which either: “among loan applicants who appear to be identical some 
receive a loan and others do not, and the rejected applicants would not receive a 
                                                     
6
 Note to marker: The current model was developed independently prior to coming across these 
similar papers. 
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loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; or, identifiable groups of 
individuals in the population who, with a given supply of credit, are unable to 
obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit, they 
would”. Unfortunately, no model of credit rationing has yet been widely accepted. 
The Stiglitz and Weiss paper has been criticised by Arnold and Riley (2009) and 
Hart (1985) (referenced in Tirole (2006)) who show that the assumed funds 
supply curve is not possible and the structure of their moral hazard problem can 
be solved by using a profit sharing contract. 
 
In the context of moral hazard, Tirole (2006) shows credit rationing can occur if 
the entrepreneur does not have sufficient funds available for partial self-financing. 
This model assumes entrepreneurs have access to private benefits which are 
realized if they choose to misbehave. These private benefits are interpreted as 
lower cost of effort or diverted resources. Firms are considered credit rationed in 
this model if they could benefit from a loan but no loan contract exists that both 
induces good behaviour and is acceptable to the lender
7
. 
 
Overconfidence as an explanation for credit rationing was first considered in the 
context of credit markets in de Meza and Southey (1996). In this paper, a firm is 
considered credit rationed if a firm has access to a project they see as profitable 
but cannot gain the financing required to invest at its perceived optimal size. In 
this model, as in Tirole (2006), firms with insufficient personal assets for 
investment are not able to gain financing. 
 
                                                     
7
 This doesn’t quite fit the definition provided in Stiglitz and Weiss. 
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Overconfidence has been used in other instances in the economics literature. 
Landier and Thesmar (2009) construct a model to show that overconfident 
entrepreneurs will choose short term finance over long term finance. However, 
this model may have questionable validity as it assumes realistic entrepreneurs 
possess projects with no potential for loss. Nonetheless, this paper also shows 
empirically, using French data, that overconfident managers do tend to prefer 
short term finance. In an interesting experimental paper, Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999) show that individuals enter skill-based competition when it is against their 
best interest and demonstrate the concept of ‘reference group neglect’. This 
concept refers to situations in which individuals excessively enter skill-based 
competition even when they know the group has self-selected with the knowledge 
that the competition would be skill-based. This model provides empirical 
justification for using overconfidence in a formal model. 
 
3.3 The model 
A population of entrepreneurs are assumed to have access to an indivisible project 
requiring investment  . Entrepreneurs’ initial investable wealth,  , is assumed to 
be small enough such that the firm requires external financing to proceed with the 
project (     ). Both the return to their next best employment alternative and 
the alternative return to the investable assets   are normalised to zero. The 
alternative return on funds for the lender is also normalised to zero.  
 
The project returns   upon success, with    , and 0 upon failure. The return   
is then split into a repayment    which is returned to the lender and profit    
which is returned to the firm. The central feature of this model is that 
entrepreneurs have systematically higher estimates of their probabilities of 
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success than the estimates made by lenders. The borrower’s assessment of the 
probability of success is denoted by    and the lender’s assessment of the 
probability of success is denoted by  , with     . In the welfare analysis, it is 
assumed that lenders know the true probability of success. 
 
Entrepreneurs first have the choice between applying and not applying to the 
lender for financing. If the firm applies, the lender either offers a contract 
(     ), which is either accepted or rejected by the entrepreneur, or the lender 
declines to offer a lending contract. Situations in which the firm applies for 
financing and then finds the terms of the contract unacceptable, or the lender 
declines to offer a contract to the firm, are interpreted as credit rationing. If the 
firm applies for financing, they do so with the expectation that the lender will 
come to the same assessment of the likelihood of success. This causes the firm to 
have a different expectation of the structure of the lending contract prior to 
applying, compared to the one actually offered by the lender. The amounts which 
the firm expects to go to the lender and themself respectively, prior to applying, 
are denoted as   
  and   
 . Lenders are competitive, both firms and lenders are risk 
neutral, and there are no transaction costs. 
 
An important assumption is that firms do not update their probability of success 
upon viewing the lending contract. This is interpreted as the firm manager 
viewing the bank’s assessment as inferior, consistent with the idea of 
overconfidence. Partial updating would retain the main results of this model but 
full updating would result in all overconfident firms with poor projects failing to 
invest following application. 
 
32 
 
The variables in the model are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Summary of variables in overconfidence model. 
Variable Description 
  The required investment in order to proceed with the project. 
  The entrepreneur’s initial assets able to be invested in the project. 
  Total return to the project upon success. 
   
The share of   specified in the lending contract that goes to the 
lender. 
   
The share of   specified in the lending contract that goes to the 
borrower. 
  
  
The share of   the entrepreneur expects to go to the lender prior to 
applying. 
  
  
The share of   the entrepreneur expects to go to the borrower prior 
to applying. 
  The lender-assessed probability of success. 
   The borrower-assessed probability of success. 
 
Proposition 1 
Firms will apply for financing if they believe they have a positive net present 
value (NPV) project. 
The firm applies for financing using their own probability assessment to 
determine what they expect the lending contract to be. Since firms must expect to 
gain a payoff larger than consuming their assets, the rationality constraint for the 
firm to apply is 
     
     (22) 
Since lenders are competitive, the expected profit the entrepreneur anticipates the 
lender to gain must be zero: 
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  (   )     (23) 
Combining conditions (22) and (23) yields the result 
  (  
   
  
)     
 
          (24) 
So the firm will apply for financing if it believes the net present value to the 
project is positive. 
 
Proposition 2 
Lending always occurs if both firms and lenders believe the firm has a positive net 
present value (NPV) project. 
The previous result shows that the firm will apply if it believes it has a positive 
NPV project. The lender offers a contract based on the zero profit condition: 
 
    (   )     (25) 
   is obtained from (25) and        . Thus, the contract that the lender 
presents to the firm is 
 
(     )  (
   
 
 
   (   )
 
)  (26) 
Since the contract is acceptable to the lender by construction, to show that lending 
occurs we simply need to show that this contract is acceptable to the borrower. 
This is true if 
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And, replacing    with its least value from (24) (note that this includes both 
pessimistic and overconfident borrowers), the previous statement becomes 
 
 
 
   (   )
 
    
  (   (   ))       
 (   )    (   )     
 (   )(    )     
So, when         and       , this is true. Despite overconfident 
borrowers obtaining less profit than they expected to upon application, the project 
nonetheless goes ahead if both parties agree that it is profitable.  
 
Interesting outcomes occur when the firm believes it has a positive NPV project 
and the lender believes the firm has a negative NPV project. In what follows, it is 
assumed that         and       . 
 
Proposition 3 
The lender declines to offer financing if the firm’s initial investable wealth is less 
than the expected loss to the project divided by the probability of failure or 
  
    
   
. 
From (26), the best contract return the borrower is able to obtain is 
   
   (   )
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The lender will decline to offer financing if it is sure the contract will be 
unacceptable to the borrower
8
, no matter what their assessed probability of 
success. The contract is unacceptable to the borrower if 
        
The lender does not know the firm’s degree of overconfidence; however, the bank 
can place the upper bound of certainty on the borrower’s probability assessment. 
Assuming a certain borrower with     , the contract will be unacceptable if 
   (   )
 
    
 
   
    
(   )
  (27) 
Thus, an overconfident firm requires some level of self-financing in order for the 
lender to offer them a contract. 
 
Proposition 4 
The firm will decline the lenders offer for financing if the level of overconfidence 
is such that:     
  
  (    )
. 
Given a contract is offered by the lender, the contract will be unacceptable to the 
borrower if 
        
                                                     
8
 In this formulation, the lender is actually indifferent between offering a contract and not. 
Introducing an infinitesimal cost of offering the contract is enough to guarantee the lender will 
decline the application. 
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   (
   (   )
 
)     (28) 
In order to solve for   , it must be confirmed that the left hand side of (28) is 
positive. Since a contract is offered, condition (27) must be false: 
  
    
   
  
            
            
         
Thus, the left hand side of (28) is non-negative, immediately yielding the result 
 
   
  
  (    )
  (29) 
The interpretation of this situation is that the borrower views the contract on offer 
as both unfair and unacceptable and the entrepreneur is left better off (in belief) by 
consuming the assets  . It is necessary to confirm that there exists a borrower’s 
probability assessment that is both high enough to induce the initial application 
for financing and low enough to satisfy condition (29). There exists a    that 
satisfies both (24) and (29) if 
 
 
 
  
  (    )
  
This holds true if 
            
both of which are assumptions of the model. The proof is given in Appendix 3. 
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Corollary 1 
The firm will accept the lenders offer for financing if they have sufficient 
investable wealth and optimism so that   
    
(   )
 and    
  
  (    )
  
This follows directly from propositions 3 and 4. If condition (27) is violated the 
lender will offer a lending contract and the lending contract will be accepted so 
long as condition (29) also does not hold. Note that the violation of condition (27) 
also implies the right hand side of condition (29) is less than or equal to one so 
there does exist a level of overconfidence that allows lending to occur. 
 
3.4 Welfare and overall investment 
Overall welfare can be calculated as the sum of consumer surplus, producer profit, 
and payments to resource holders. In what follows, it is assumed for simplicity 
that consumer surplus is zero, that is, firms are able to extract all surplus from 
consumers. 
 
Firstly note that, if an investment   would otherwise not be put to more productive 
use, a firm investing causes an increase in overall welfare, even if the NPV of the 
project is negative. To see this, note that the expected profit for a project is      
and the payments to resource holders is  , making the overall change in welfare 
      Thus, the value of the total expected production will be the measure of 
welfare used. 
 
Consider an economy in which only genuinely positive NPV projects exist and 
there is no overconfidence. When overconfidence is introduced, three effects 
occur. Firstly, firms with genuinely negative NPV projects begin to invest, 
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causing an increase in investment and production. Secondly, as more projects are 
invested in, demand for resources (such as labour) increases, increasing costs for 
all firms and causing marginal realistic firms to not invest. And thirdly, as more 
individuals become entrepreneurs, more individuals withdraw from the labour 
workforce, resulting in a decrease in labour supply. This again increases costs for 
all firms and causes marginal realistic firms to not invest.  
 
If the production gained from the new investment outweighs the production lost 
from other projects no longer going ahead, an overall increase in welfare will 
result. If an economy’s resources are fully employed in positive NPV projects, 
introducing overconfident firms with negative NPV projects will divert resources 
to less productive uses. Thus, in the full-employment scenario, overconfidence 
reduces welfare. However, in a more realistic economy where there is 
unemployment, introducing overconfident firms can potentially increase the total 
use of resources and result in higher production. 
 
An attempt was made to formally demonstrate the overall equilibrium effect of 
introducing overconfidence in the presence of unemployment. In order to capture 
the important effects from the previous section, firms varied by initial wealth   
and self-assessed probability of success   . In addition, in order to include both 
firms with positive and negative NPV projects, firms varied by  . The variables 
      and   were uniform distributed and independent, labour was the only 
resource, and the cost of a unit of labour was assumed fixed. An expression for 
welfare was obtained using Maple which ran 6 screens long and is thus omitted. 
At the end of this section is a summary of the method employed. All sample 
numerical increases in the level of overconfidence, holding other parameters 
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constant, resulted in an increase in overall welfare. This result is driven by the 
assumption that the cost of labour is fixed, regardless of the level of employment. 
More realistic modelling of the labour market is required to show that 
overconfidence can still decrease welfare in the presence of unemployment. 
 
In order to investigate the effects of other parameters on the level of investment 
within a group of overconfident firms, a simpler economy is set up where 
attention is limited to only overconfident firms with negative NPV projects. 
 
Suppose there is a density of individuals with access to identical projects who 
vary by overconfidence and initial wealth. Individuals are able to become 
entrepreneurs or workers; entrepreneurs invest and employ all non-entrepreneurs. 
Labour is the only resource and the required investment   is interpreted as a fixed 
amount of wages that is distributed evenly to a firm’s share of workers. The total 
external labour (excluding the entrepreneur) required to complete the firm’s 
project is assumed to be fixed and provided collectively by the firm’s share of 
workers (to capture unemployment, labour capacity constraints are assumed to be 
non-binding). The wage rate per unit of labour is also assumed to be fixed. This 
implies that more firms operating will increase the amount of labour each worker 
provides and, subsequently, their total wages. It is assumed there is no opportunity 
cost of labour other than entrepreneurship itself. 
 
Let the proportion of entrepreneurs in the population be  . The wages per worker 
is then
9
    (   ). It is assumed that   is uniform distributed on [   ̅] and    is 
                                                     
9
 Let the number of entrepreneurs be    and the number of workers   . The wages paid by each 
firm is   so the rate paid per worker is       . 
 
   
 
  
     
  
  
     
 
  
  
. 
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uniform distributed on [ ̲   ] and both variables are independent. It is assumed 
there are some individuals who do not apply for financing in equilibrium ( ̲   
  
 
   
   ) and there are no realists or pessimists ( ̲   ). The opportunity 
cost of entrepreneurship was assumed to be zero in the previous section. Because 
the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship is now the value of wages per worker, 
each of the above propositions must be modified. 
 
Proposition 1a 
Firms will apply for financing if they believe they have a positive net present 
value (NPV) project, net of their opportunity cost of investment. 
The condition for application is modified to 
 
    
    
 
   
   (30) 
Again, the firm will expect their share of the repayment to be based on the bank’s 
zero profit condition but using the firm’s probability assessment. The above 
condition then becomes 
  (  
   
  
)    
 
   
   
 
       
 
   
     (31) 
This has the same interpretation as earlier. The firm will apply if it believes the 
net present value to the project, net of their opportunity cost, is positive. The 
difference with the previous proposition simply exists due to being unable to 
normalise the opportunity cost to zero. 
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Proposition 2a 
Lending occurs if both lenders and firms believe the firm has a positive net 
present value (NPV) project net of the firm’s opportunity cost. 
Lenders believe the firm has a positive NPV project net of their opportunity cost if 
     
 
   
   . As previously shown, the firm applies for financing if they 
believe they have a positive NPV project net of the opportunity cost of 
entrepreneurship. They will accept the contract if the actual contract offered obeys 
their rationality constraint: 
       
 
   
   
   
   (   )
 
   
 
   
   
And, replacing    with its least value from (31), the previous statement becomes 
 
 
 
 
   
   (   )
 
   
 
   
   
  (   (   ))    (   )        
   (   )(   )   (   )     
 (  (   )   )(   )     
 (   
 
   
) (   )     
 (     
 
   
 ) (   )     
This is true for firms for which the lender believes the firm has a positive NPV 
project, net of the firm’s opportunity cost, showing the proposition is true. Note 
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that this result also extends to pessimistic individuals who still believe they have a 
positive NPV project net of their opportunity cost. As was the case earlier, 
interesting cases occur when the lender believes the firm has a negative NPV 
project net of the firm’s opportunity cost and the firm believes they have a 
positive NPV project net of their opportunity cost. Thus, it is assumed that 
     
 
   
    and       
 
   
  . 
 
Proposition 3a 
The lender declines to offer financing if the firm’s initial investable wealth is such 
that   
 
 
   
      
(   )
. 
By the zero profit constraint, the best contract return the borrower is able to obtain 
is 
   
   (   )
 
  
And, as before, the lender won’t offer financing if it knows the contract will be 
unacceptable to the borrower. The contract is unacceptable to the borrower if 
  
   (   )
 
   
 
   
   
And, assuming a certain (infinitely overconfident) borrower, the contract will be 
unacceptable if 
   (   )      
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(   )
  (32) 
 
Proposition 4a 
The firm will decline the lenders offer for financing if the level of overconfidence 
is such that:     
 (  
 
   
 )
      
. 
Given a contract is offered by the lender, the contract will be unacceptable to the 
borrower if 
       
 
   
   
   (
   (   )
 
)    
 
   
   
Since a contract is offered, condition (32) is false implying the left hand side of 
the above inequality is non-negative, immediately yielding the result 
 
    
 (  
 
    )
      
  (33) 
And again, to confirm there exists a level of overconfidence where the firm both 
applies and finds the offered contract unacceptable the following inequality must 
hold: 
 (  
 
   )
 
 
 (  
 
    )
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This holds true if 
         
 
   
     
both of which are assumptions of the model. The proof is similar to that given in 
Appendix 3. 
 
A formula for the proportion of entrepreneurs in the population   will now be 
derived. From proposition 4a, the marginal entrepreneur satisfies 
 
   
 (  
 
    )
      
    (34) 
This is a negative relationship
10
 between    and  . The lower initial assets are, the 
higher the overconfidence threshold for accepting the lending contract is. The 
range for the   variable for which individuals become entrepreneurs is from   , 
such that   ( 
 )   , to  ̅. Rearranging (34) with     ,  
  is found to be 
   
 
 
         
(   )
  
When    ̅,    is 
   
 ( ̅  
 
    )
 ̅      
  
When     ̅   ,    is 
   
 
 (   )
  
                                                     
10
 The numerator of        is:  (      )   (  
 
   
 )   (     
 
   
 )    
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These relationships are graphed in Figure 2 below with  ̅   . 
Figure 2 – Solution regions for economy of individuals with negative NPV 
projects with  ̅   . 
 
Area 1 in Figure 2 represents those firms who do not apply for financing as they 
have negative self-assessed NPV. Area 2 represents those firms who are 
immediately denied financing as there is no level of overconfidence which would 
make an offered loan contract acceptable. Area 3 represents those firms who are 
offered a contract but do not accept. Area 4 represents those firms who do accept 
the offered contract and invest. Area 4 divided by the total area of the plot yields 
the proportion of entrepreneurs  . For  ̅   , this can be calculated as the solution 
to 
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Calculating the inner integral yields 
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And when  ̅      satisfies 
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(37) 
There is no closed form solution for   for the above equation. Solutions can easily 
be found numerically for given       using a numerical solver. Appendix 4 
justifies why there is a unique real solution to this equation that satisfies the 
assumptions of the model. 
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To sum up, the most wealthy and overconfident individuals are those that end up 
becoming entrepreneurs. Those that enter entrepreneurship effectively transfer 
part of their initial wealth to workers with the process enabled by predatory 
lending (lending which is, in reality, harmful to the borrower). Because the firms 
do have positive production, an overall welfare gain results from overconfidence 
when there are no realists. The expected final wealth for an entrepreneur with 
initial wealth    is 
     
and substituting from (26), 
  
   (    )
 
  
    (    )  
So, in reality, entrepreneurs can expect to lose the expected loss to the project. 
The final wealth for a worker with initial wealth    is 
   
 
   
   
Thus, workers gain the wages per worker 
 
   
 . The average gain in welfare is the 
same as the average production per person: 
 
   (    )  (   )
 
   
   (     )    (38) 
Thus, despite the projects not being economic for the entrepreneurs, the projects 
have social value as there is still a positive probability of success. 
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3.5 Comparative statics 
In order to investigate how the parameters alter total welfare in an economy of 
overconfident firms, the boundaries of the region in      space that represents the 
population must be fixed at [ ̲   ]  [   ̅] so the   derivatives must be calculated 
using (36). The expressions for several of the derivatives are quite long and are 
thus omitted. For those derivatives which are omitted, the sign of the expression 
was determined numerically. The left hand side of (36) is denoted as  (       )   
 
The effect on average welfare of an increase in the probability of success of all 
projects is 
  
  
 
  
  
    (     )   
  
  
  
  
  
    (     )     
The effect of the true probability of success on welfare comes from two sources. 
Firstly, the lender offers contracts with lower repayments and to more potential 
borrowers, causing more borrowers to find the contract acceptable. However, as 
more firms enter, the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship increases, somewhat 
mitigating the increase. Note that this doesn’t affect the firm’s own assessments of 
their probability of success, only that of the lender, and thus the proportion of 
firms applying for financing is only affected by the change in the opportunity cost. 
 
The effect of increasing the cost of investment (wages) on welfare is 
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The result for the cost of investment also comes from two sources. Firstly, 
increasing the cost of investment directly increases costs for firms so fewer firms 
will apply for financing and fewer firms will find the offered contract acceptable. 
Also, because wages increase, the opportunity cost of investment increases, 
further decreasing entry into entrepreneurship. 
 
The effect of increasing the return to the project upon success on welfare is 
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The project return upon success   affects overall welfare in a similar way to the 
probability of success. Again, the lender offers contracts with lower repayments 
and to more potential borrowers, causing more borrowers to find the contract 
acceptable. However, increasing   also directly increases the number of 
individuals who apply for financing, further increasing investment. And again, as 
more firms enter, the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship increases, mitigating 
the increase in investment as with the probability of success. 
 
The degree of credit rationing is another important empirical statistic so it is 
interesting to investigate how the parameters affect this. Credit rationing can be 
affected both by the proportion of applicants being credit rationed and the change 
in the proportion of individuals applying for financing. The proportion of firms 
applying is gained by taking the total of areas 2, 3, and 4 and dividing by the total 
area. The proportion of firms credit rationed, denoted by  , is then gained by 
subtracting the proportion of entrepreneurs  : 
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The various derivatives can be calculated again using (36). 
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The effect of   on the equilibrium level of credit rationing works in several ways. 
Given a firm has applied for financing, an increase in   increases the repayment 
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required by the lender, causing the borrower to be less likely to find the loan 
contract acceptable, increasing credit rationing. However, the increase in   makes 
the application decision less attractive so fewer borrowers apply for financing in 
the first place, decreasing credit rationing. The reduction in the total proportion of 
individuals being entrepreneurs also reduces the opportunity cost to 
entrepreneurship, making entrepreneurship more attractive and making it less 
likely for firms to reject the lender’s offer for financing as well as increasing the 
number of individuals applying. The positive result is interesting here as it shows 
that, using the uniform distribution, all these competing effects net out to be 
overall positive. 
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(   ̲ ) (   ) 
 
  
  
    
The effect of increasing the project return on equilibrium credit rationing is 
positive for low values of    and negative for high values of   . Firstly, when 
the project return increases, the proportion of firms applying for financing 
increases, increasing the proportion of firms being credit rationed. Since the 
required repayment decreases, the proportion of applicants finding the lending 
contract acceptable will increase, decreasing the proportion of firms being credit 
rationed. 
 
When    is low, the proportion of firms applying for financing is low and 
increasing   will cause a large increase in the proportion of applicants and a 
smaller increase in the number of firms finding the lending contract acceptable, 
thus increasing credit rationing. Once   is high enough, the increase in the 
proportion of firms applying for financing slows and the increase in the number of 
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firms accepting the contract begins to dominate, causing the proportion of 
rationed firms to decrease.  
  
  
  
 
  
  
(   ̲ ) (   ) 
 
  
  
    
As would be intuitively expected, increasing the objective probability of success 
will reduce the incidence of credit rationing due to overconfidence as the lending 
contract becomes more attractive to the lender. The proportion of firms applying 
remains constant so all of the effect is due to more lending contracts being 
accepted. 
 
In order to capture the effect of overconfidence on diverting resources from more 
productive projects, the economy must be set up so that firms with good projects 
can potentially be displaced by firms with poor projects. Thus, firms are varied by 
probability of success in order to include individuals who have both positive and 
negative NPV projects. As more firms with poor projects invest due to 
overconfidence, more resources can potentially be diverted from genuinely good 
projects.  
 
Now,   ,  , and   vary uniformly across [ ̲   ̅ ]  [ ̲  ̅]  [   ̅]  The 
parameters are chosen such that both optimistic and pessimistic firms exist in the 
economy. The proportion of entrepreneurs   can then be determined as the 
solution to 
54 
 
 
 ̅( ̅   ̲)( ̅   ̲ )
(
 
 
∫ ∫ ∫    
 ̅ 
 (  
 
   
 )
      
  
 ̅
  (
 
   
)     
(   )
  
 
 
 
   
 ̲
  ̅ ( ̅  
 
 
 
   
) ( ̅  
 
 
 
   
)
)
 
 
    
where the integral represents all firms with negative NPV projects that are able to 
obtain financing and the product represents all firms sufficiently optimistic to 
apply for financing who have positive NPV projects. The total represents all firms 
who engage in their projects. 
 
Total welfare is then represented by the integral of    across all entering 
entrepreneurs with respect to  : 
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As aforementioned, sample numerical derivatives of this expression with respect 
to  ̅  and  ̲  showed that increasing overconfidence (an increase in  ̅  or  ̲ ) 
increases welfare in this economy.  
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This result is driven by the assumption that the cost of labour is fixed, regardless 
of the level of employment. To see this, consider an individual who becomes an 
entrepreneur due to a small increase in overconfidence. This individual is 
removed from the labour force and also employs a share of workers. To 
compensate for the loss of workers, the amount of labour provided by each 
individual increases. However, the total cost of labour per firm does not increase 
as wages per unit of labour are assumed to be fixed. 
 
The only effect that can drive down investment following the entry of this new 
firm is the increase in wages per worker as this is the opportunity cost of 
entrepreneurship. However, if a single entrepreneur with a genuinely good project 
now finds it better to cease entrepreneurship and enter the workforce, the 
opportunity cost would return to the original value. Thus, the number of firms that 
enter must outnumber the number of firms that exit as a result of an increase in 
overconfidence. The trialled numerical derivatives also suggest that the total 
production gained also outnumbers the total production lost when using the 
uniformly distributed population as in this section. Incorporating an increasing 
labour supply curve and general population distributions into this analysis is a task 
for future work that will yield conditions for increases in overconfidence causing 
either increases or decreases in total welfare. 
 
3.6 Collateral 
In this section overconfidence is shown to be a justification for collateral. Firms 
have the option to offer collateral  , with maximum value  ̅, on their loan 
contract which is interpreted as illiquid assets which are worth more to the 
entrepreneur than to the lender. The firm’s value of collateral is   and the lender’s 
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value of collateral is    with      . Firms apply expecting a continuum of 
contracts (  
    ) to be offered by the lender. Following application, the lender 
either offers a continuum of acceptable contracts (    ) or declines to offer a 
contract. The entrepreneur then chooses their optimal lending contract, or declines 
the lender’s offer for financing. All other notation is unchanged.  
 
Proposition 1 still holds if collateral is available. The rationality constraint for the 
firm’s application decision is now 
    
  (    )(  
 )     
The firm anticipates the lender to require zero profit so the contract satisfies the 
zero profit constraint: 
    
  (    )  
       
Therefore   
  satisfies 
  
      
  
    (    (    )   
 )
  
  
Substituting this into the firm’s rationality constraint yields 
      (    )(   ) 
     
The firm will also anticipate that they will choose the optimal contract which has 
     so their application constraint is unchanged from that in proposition 1: 
         
Proposition 2 also holds if collateral is available. The offered contract set obeys 
the zero profit condition: 
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Thus, the relationship between    and   in the contract set is 
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  (40) 
with   [   ̅]. The firm will accept if any contract satisfies their rationality 
constraint for acceptance. So setting    11 immediately yields the result from 
proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 3b 
The lender declines to offer financing if the firm’s initial investable wealth and 
available collateral are such that     ̅  
    
(   )
. 
The lender will decline to offer financing if there is no level of overconfidence 
which will make the most attractive available contract acceptable to the borrower. 
The firm’s rationality constraint for the acceptance of the lending contract (    ) 
is 
 
     (    )(  )     (41) 
Substituting in (40), (41) becomes 
   (  
    (   )  
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                (   )    (    )(  )      
                                                     
11
 Note that this is not necessarily the actual contract chosen. 
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The firm chooses   to maximise the left hand side of this expression. Thus, for 
collateral to appear in the most attractive contract, the coefficient on   here must 
be positive. This is true for firms whose liquidation value of the collateral satisfies 
 
  
 (    )
  (   )
  (43) 
Given condition (43), the entrepreneur will choose the maximum collateral  ̅. 
Under this model, collateral can be arbitrarily high as long as    is allowed to be 
negative. That is, a nonstandard lending contract is possible where the 
entrepreneur is first financed by the bank and the bank gives the entrepreneur 
further funds upon success while the entrepreneur hands over a large amount of 
collateral (larger than the size of the loan) upon failure. Note that (43) also implies 
that the most overconfident firms (with      ) will always make use of collateral 
as long as it has some positive value to the lender (   ) and the least 
overconfident firms (with      ) will not make use of collateral as    . 
 
Since those with the highest level of overconfidence will find it optimal to use 
collateral, the most overconfident firms will reject all contracts if condition (42) 
fails for     : 
(   )  (   )  ̅  (    )  
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Proposition 4b 
The firm will decline the lenders offer for financing if the level of overconfidence 
is such that:        {
  
      
 
 (   ̅)
(       (   (   )) ̅)
}  
The condition that determines which element of the minimum is active is shown 
below: 
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For firms which fail condition (43), proposition 4 holds. It must be shown that this 
is consistent with the inequality in the proposition. The first element of the 
minimum is active for this firm if condition (45) holds. If condition (45) fails, 
condition (43) failing implies that    is less than the second element of the 
minimum. This is shown below: 
  
 (    )
  (   )
  
    
 
(   )   
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The right hand side of the above inequality is less than the second element of the 
minimum if condition (45) fails: 
 
(   )   
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Thus,    is less than the second element of the minimum if both conditions (43) 
and (45) fail. 
 
If condition (43) holds, the firm will find the offered contract set unacceptable if 
(    )  (         (   )) ̅    (    )  
   (  (   (   )) ̅      )   (   ̅)  
    
 (   ̅)
(  (   (   )) ̅      )
  
Which is the smallest in the minimum when condition (45) fails. There are no 
firms which will decline the lenders offer of financing if both conditions (43) and 
(45) hold. As shown above, if condition (43) holds the firm will reject the offer of 
financing if 
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And, as shown above, 
 (   ̅)
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(   )   
  
if condition (45) holds. Since     ((   )   )⁄  when condition (43) holds, 
no firms will reject the offer of financing.  
 
For values of    which satisfy (43), the firm’s rationality constraint can be 
satisfied by offering collateral. Intuitively, the firm has such confidence in its 
project that the reduction in interest rate in the good state gained by pledging 
collateral outweighs their value of the expected loss of collateral in the bad state. 
The results from above are shown in the      plane in Figure 3. The effect of the 
opportunity cost of entrepreneurship and the application constraint are suppressed. 
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Figure 3 – Graph illustrating various solution regions across the      plane.  
 
Area 1 in Figure 3 represents those firms with insufficient investable assets and 
collateral for the lender to offer a contract. Area 2 represents those firms who find 
the lender’s offer of financing unacceptable. Area 3 represents those firms who 
accept the lending contract but do not offer collateral as the liquid value is too 
low. Area 4 represents those firms who accept the lending contract and do find the 
liquid value high enough to offer collateral. 
 
Note that the availability of collateral increases the number of projects that are 
funded. Prior to the introduction of collateral area 4 would have stopped at the 
light dotted line. With collateral, those firms between the light dotted line and the 
heavy dotted line are now able to invest. 
 
 
    
(   )(   )
 
2 
4 
3 
1 
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Proposition 5 
For given values of other parameters, the availability of collateral reduces or 
does not change the level of credit rationing. 
Since the contract     is always available and the application condition is 
unchanged by the introduction of collateral, no extra firms will be credit rationed 
under collateral. It is clear from Figure 3 that some firms who previously would 
have been credit rationed can make use of collateral and gain funding for their 
project. These are the firms in area 4 between the heavy and light dotted lines with 
     satisfying 
 (   ̅)
(       (   (   )) ̅)
       {
  
      
  }  
    
   
   ̅    
    
(   )(   )
  
 
The solution to the model when considering collateral is summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3 – Summary of solution for overconfidence model with collateral. 
Conditions on      for given    ̅       Solution 
   
 
 
 
Firm-assessed NPV is negative 
so firm does not apply. 
   
 
 
     ̅  
    
   
 
Firm-assessed NPV is positive 
so the firm applies for 
financing. Investable assets 
plus collateral are too low for 
the lender to justify making an 
offer of financing to the firm as 
the lender knows even the most 
overconfident entrepreneur 
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would reject any offer of 
financing that is acceptable to 
the lender. 
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(   )   
}  
    
   
   ̅      
Firm-assessed NPV is positive 
but collateral is not valuable 
enough to the lender to make it 
worth the loss of efficiency for 
the firm. Investable assets plus 
collateral are high enough for 
the lender to offer a contract 
but credit rationing occurs as 
the borrower finds all offered 
contracts unacceptable. 
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Firm-assessed NPV is positive 
and collateral is valuable 
enough to the lender to make it 
worth the loss of efficiency for 
the firm. The firm is, however, 
not overconfident enough to 
accept the contract so credit is 
rationed. 
  
      
    
 
(   )   
  
    
(   )(   )
     
Firm-assessed NPV is positive, 
assets are high enough for the 
lender to offer a contract and 
the firm is overconfident 
enough to accept the lender’s 
offer of financing. Collateral is 
not valuable enough to the 
lender to make it worth the loss 
of efficiency to the firm so no 
collateral is offered. 
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Firm-assessed NPV is positive 
and collateral is valuable 
enough to the lender to make it 
worth the loss of efficiency for 
the firm. Lending occurs as the 
borrower is overconfident 
enough to gain a high enough 
return from the offered 
financing deal. 
 
A testable prediction is implied by this model that is not made explicit in the 
paper by de Meza and Southey (1996) is that, amongst overconfident 
entrepreneurs, potentially only a fraction will make use of illiquid assets for 
collateral
12
. This fraction of firms using collateral is positively related to the 
liquidation fraction   and negatively related to the probability of success    
 
A similar equilibrium model as in the previous section can be set up which 
explicitly models the firm’s opportunity cost of entrepreneurship when taking 
explicit account of collateral. Since part of the value of collateral is lost if this is 
transferred to the lender, there is a dead weight loss associated with the use of 
collateral in this context. To briefly analyse this, assume that the liquidation value 
of collateral is such that all entrepreneurs make full use of collateral. If the 
proportion of entrepreneurs in the economy is again  , the overall average change 
in welfare, assuming the lender has the correct probability assessment, can be 
expressed as 
    (    (   ) ̅   )  (   ) (
 
   
)    
                                                     
12
 All entering firms will use collateral if 
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Thus, the average change in welfare is the average production per firm less the 
average expected loss in value of collateral. Since  ̅ is able to be made arbitrarily 
large, this expression can be potentially negative. Because there is a loss in value 
of the collateral as a result of liquidation, there is potentially a loss in overall 
welfare as a result of overconfidence, even amongst a population of all 
overconfident firms. 
 
3.7 Relation to private benefits of successful entrepreneurship 
Intuitively, one would suspect similar seemingly high entry into entrepreneurship 
if firms were to gain some private benefit upon the success of their firm. This 
could be interpreted as psychological satisfaction of success, preferences for 
independence, or preferences for control, for example. This can explain excess 
entry into entrepreneurship, compared to what would be expected if income was 
the only consideration (see, for example, Levesque et al. (2002)), but cannot 
explain credit rationing or collateral. This section demonstrates why. 
 
The firm now applies for financing using the true probability assessment but they 
gain an extra private payoff in the good state. Thus, their application constraint is 
 (    )  (   )     
And since the firm knows the lending contracts which will be offered the 
inequality becomes 
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Thus, the firm will choose the minimum collateral    , making private benefits 
unable to explain the existence of collateral. In addition, the firm must be able to 
fully repay the lender upon success and so the firm has the additional application 
constraint:   (   )    So the firm will apply for financing if they believe 
they have a positive private NPV project. This is the same as the original 
application constraint in proposition 1 if   (    )   . 
 
However, since the firm has anticipated the actual lending contract which will be 
offered by the lender, the application constraints guarantee the acceptance 
constraints will be satisfied. Thus, no immediate denials will occur and no 
unacceptable contracts will be offered. Private benefits of successful 
entrepreneurship are unable to explain credit rationing. 
 
3.8 Discussion/Conclusion 
Similar to de Meza and Southey (1996), this chapter has shown that 
overconfidence in the probability of success of a project can explain credit 
rationing, both in the sense of firms receiving a denial of financing when they 
expected an acceptance and the sense of firms being offered lending contracts 
which they found to be unacceptable. 
 
In addition to adding some extra precision to the process of application and 
acceptance of lending contracts, this chapter shows that overconfidence can 
increase the employment of resources, resulting in a gain in overall welfare. In all 
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cases, overconfident firms unwittingly transfer wealth from themselves to 
resource holders (such as their employees) and the predatory lending markets 
facilitate this transfer. 
 
This chapter also makes explicit why collateral is able to be explained by 
overconfidence. The most overconfident firms are able to gain what they see as 
value from collateral as they can gain lower interest rates. These firms weight the 
probability of losing the collateral lower than they should and subsequently lose 
value on average in reality. 
 
An interesting practical question is: should government encourage or discourage 
overconfidence? If employment is low, extra overconfident firms are unlikely to 
divert significant resources from more productive firms. Thus, in times when 
employment is low, it may be in society’s interest to encourage wealthy 
individuals to be overconfident in their business prospects. However, there are 
some clear ethical problems with encouraging individuals to engage in behaviour 
which is harmful to them and there is no obvious mechanism by which this could 
be achieved. It may be ethically justifiable in the same way that progressive 
taxation is justifiable as overconfidence results in potentially desirable 
distributional outcomes. 
 
More realistic modelling of the labour market is required to enhance the welfare 
analysis in this chapter. The amount of labour provided by an entrepreneur is 
larger than that provided by a single worker when there is unemployment. Since 
cost of effort was assumed to be zero, the implications of this were suppressed. 
Since entrepreneurship has a higher cost of effort than working, the opportunity 
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cost of entrepreneurship is understated in the current version of the model. 
Modelling cost of effort in a way which yields an upward sloping labour supply 
curve will make it possible to capture the effect of resources being diverted from 
more productive uses. 
 
Potential extensions to this model include introducing more general distributions 
of the parameters to better investigate the effects of potential changes in 
parameters. Adding reasonable distributional judgements to the social welfare 
function is another possible avenue for future models. In the current model, an 
extra dollar for a low wealth individual is worth just as much as an extra dollar for 
a high wealth individual. Thus, introducing risk aversion over final wealth could 
provide some more insight into making recommendations for policy here. 
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5. Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Maple output for debt and firm size aversion model 
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Appendix 2  
The second order conditions for the unconstrained optimisation problem are 
shown below: 
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Appendix 3 
Proposition: 
 
 
 
  
      
  
        , by (27): 
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This will be positive if both terms are positive. So,       and        
guarantee there is value of    which satisfies both (24) and (29). 
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Appendix 4 
Maple shows the solution for   depends on the roots of the following equation: 
(  )         (   )     ((    )     )
   ( (  )            )  (  )         
The left hand side    as   . Dominated by the term 
    ((    )     )  
The left hand side goes to minus infinity as       This is dominated by 
    (   )  
If      the left hand side is 
 (   )     
Thus equation (37) has at least 2 solution and has an even number of real 
solutions. 
 
All numerical examples trialled yielded two solutions for   [   ] with only the 
least solution satisfying     
 
   
   , which is the expected return on the 
project to the most optimistic borrower. If   were at this higher solution, there 
would be no firms applying for financing. 
